The Spectacle of Drug Violence: American Public Discourse, Media, and Border Enforcement in the Texas-Tamaulipas Border Region during Drug-War Times by Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera
199
NORTEAMÉRICA, Year 7, Issue 2, July-December, 2012
Recibido: 06/01/2012        Aceptado: 17/04/2012
AbstrAct
This article explains how mass media and U.S. political rhetoric have created a “spec tacle” of 
border violence as an offshoot of Mexico’s drug war. The study shows how some U.S. politicians 
and government officials have promoted their political agendas by communicating an alarmist 
view of the drug war within Mexico that includes a spillover of violence into the United States 
and narco-terrorism, which allegedly re present enormous risks to U.S. national security. The cre-
ation of this spectacle has had a real impact on specific policy areas, particularly on border security 
and immigration. This analysis focuses mainly on the Texas-Tamaulipas border region.
Key words: drug violence, Texas-Tamaulipas border, American public discourse, mass media, 
spectacle, spillover violence, narco-terrorism, border security, U.S. immigration policy.
resumen
Este artículo explica cómo los medios masivos de comunicación y la retórica política en Estados 
Unidos han creado un “espectáculo” de la violencia fronteriza como resultado de la guerra contra 
las drogas que libra México. El estudio muestra cómo algunos políticos y funcionarios del gobier-
no han promovido sus agendas políticas presentando una visión alarmista de la guerra contra las 
drogas en México, que incluye el desborde de la violencia hacia Estados Unidos y el narcoterro-
rismo lo cual, aseguran, representa enormes riesgos para la seguridad nacional del país vecino. La 
creación de este espectáculo ha tenido un impacto real sobre áreas específicas de las políticas 
públicas, en particular en la seguridad fronteriza y la inmigración. Este análisis se enfoca princi-
palmente en la región fronteriza Texas-Tamaulipas.
Palabras clave: narcoviolencia, frontera Texas-Tamaulipas, discurso público estadunidense, 
medios masivos de comunicación, espectáculo, violencia desbordada, narcoterrorismo, seguri-
dad fronteriza, política migratoria estadunidense.
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IntroductIon
Violence in Mexico has reached unparalleled levels, particularly since the launch of 
military operations against drug trafficking organizations (dtos) in December 2006 by 
President Felipe Calderón. The president’s so-called “war on drugs” claimed 45 515 
lives from the beginning of his administration until September 2011, according to offi-
cial estimates.1 Extreme levels of drug-related violence have affected several regions 
of Mexico, particularly border states such as Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and 
Tamaulipas. This has stoked concern among U.S. Americans about plausible threats 
to U.S. national security. Inflammatory statements by U.S. officials and politicians and 
sensationalist media coverage have heightened these concerns, generating fear in 
the population by suggesting that extreme drug violence in Mexico could soon spill 
across the border. The idea that a terrorist attack might come from the United States’ 
southern border and that there are links between Islamic terrorists and Mexican dtos 
make up an important part of this new perception of Mexico.
Some stories in the U.S. media as well as some U.S. government statements re-
garding drug violence in Mexico can be exaggerated or inaccurate. They are often 
used by politicians to promote policy positions and to obtain funding to further their 
agendas. The result has frequently been tighter border enforcement, and at times 
mismanagement of the border, with a negative impact on Mexico-U.S. relations and 
on U.S. national security, particularly in the areas of border security and immigration. 
In recent years, some U.S. state governments have passed –or attempted to pass–
draconian immigration laws and tried to deploy the National Guard and even U.S. 
army troops to the border. These types of responses are misguided and have dam-
aged the relationship between the United States and Mexico.
No doubt, the problem of violence and insecurity in Mexico has reached unpre c-
e dented levels. In fact, drug violence in Mexico has increased exponentially since the 
year 2006, when the Mexican president declared a “war on drugs” and sent federal 
forces, including the military, to fight drug gangs. It is also true that this strategy 
does not seem to be working, and rather than the conditions being ameliorated, they 
seem to be worsening. Some analysts even claim that Mexico is fast becoming a 
“failed state.” Nevertheless, it is not clear that the threats to the United States from 
Mexico’s violence are of the magnitude that U.S. media, politicians, and officials have 
sometimes alleged.
1  This figure was released January 12, 2012, by the Office of the Mexican Attorney General (pGr) (Herrera, 
2012). Alternative sources report that Mexico’s war on drugs has claimed over 60 000 lives. For example, 
Semanario Zeta magazine estimated a total of 60 420 drug-related murders during the first five years of 
President Calderón’s administration (Mendoza, 2011).
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The present work identifies a “spectacle” of border violence created by U.S. Amer-
ican public discourse and the mass media during Mexico’s drug-war times. This 
notion builds on French theorist Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle (1967) and 
Kellner’s (2003a) extensions of the “spectacle,” foregrounding the spectacle that dis-
torts reality related to U.S. border security, thus promoting tighter border enforce-
ment and, at times, border mismanagement. The present study focuses mainly on 
the Texas-Tamaulipas border region.
The first part of this article explains the exponential escalation of drug-related 
violence in Mexico during drug-war times, as well as the situation observed in the 
southern part of the Texas-Tamaulipas border area. The following section presents an 
analysis of U.S. American public discourse and the use of the mass media to generate 
a spectacle of Mexico’s war on drugs. The analysis of media content focuses primarily 
on web-based press releases and print media,2 analyzing how U.S. politicians, offi-
cials, and the media communicate the allegedly enormous threats to U.S. national 
security from illegal immigration, spillover violence, and narco-terrorism. Finally, the 
article discusses the impact of these phenomena on border management and U.S. border 
policies, essentially border enforcement and immigration policy.
mexIco’s drug-relAted VIolence todAy
The “War on Drugs” and the Escalation of Violence in Mexico
The political panorama in Mexico has changed substantially since President Felipe 
Calderón took office December 1, 2006, and declared a “war on drugs.” Since then, the 
drug-related violence in Mexico has significantly worsened. Aside from a huge spike 
in the number of drug-related killings, there has been an explosion in the use of bar-
baric torture and killing techniques, such as dismemberment, decapitation, or the 
complete dissolution of human remains, with the aim of terrorizing the population, 
authorities, and rival drug trafficking organizations.
As a result of the drug war, corruption of government officials at all levels also 
appears to have increased. Meanwhile, the Mexican state has failed to subdue criminal 
organizations. It has lost its “monopoly of violence” as well as its monopoly on the 
power to tax, as witnessed by the rise of widespread extortion of businesses, entre-
preneurs, and society in general. Mexico has also witnessed the emergence of a new 
domestic drug market that provides affordable doses of any type of drug to Mexican 
2  It is alleged here that the analysis of these two kinds of media coverage capture quite well the basic infor-
mation presented by other media sources, such as tv, radio, and other types of social media.
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consumers. The rise of local markets has been accompanied by the use of unconven-
tional terror tactics such as car bombs, mass kidnappings, grenade attacks, blockades 
of major avenues and highways, and execution-style murders of public officials.
The president’s so-called “war on drugs” claimed 45 515 lives from the beginning 
of his administration until September 2011, according to official estimates. The number of 
drug-related murders has increased significantly every year since the policy began 
(see Table 1). Official reports show a total of 2 826 assassinations in 2007, 9 614 in 2009, and 
15 273 in 2010. Patterns of violence and geographical distribution of conflicts in the 
country have also changed in recent years. Violence tended to con centrate on Mexico’s 
northwestern border regions, especially Chihuahua, as well as in Pacific states like 
Sinaloa, Michoacán, and Guerrero. Ciudad Juárez is the city that registered the highest 
number of homicides during the first four years of Calderón’s administration –in 2010, 
approximately 3 100 people were killed in this border city. Now violence has spread to 
other regions of Mexico and has particularly increased in the states of Coahuila, Nuevo 
León, and Tamaulipas, all border states. In 2010, half of the drug-related murders in 
Mexico took place in just three states: Chihuahua, Si naloa, and Tamaulipas.
Table 1
DRUG-RELATED MURDERS (2006-2010)
2006 
(only December) 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Tamaulipas 0 80 96 90 1 209 1 475
Mexico (total) 62 2 826 6 837 9 614 15 273 34 612
Source: Oficina de la Presidencia, 2010. 
drug-relAted VIolence In northeAstern mexIco 
The case of Tamaulipas
The Texas-Tamaulipas border is a strategic region in terms of trade, migration, and 
drug trafficking. The Mexican state of Tamaulipas is a key point for drug distribu-
tion to the United States.3 It is also a major route for arms trafficking from the United 
States to Mexico and other Latin American countries as well as human trafficking from 
3  Compared to other border and coastal states, Tamaulipas’s border cities are the closest destinations (and, 
therefore, the safest ones) for drug traffickers who operate in the ports of Quintana Roo, Yucatan, and the 
Gulf of Mexico, as well as in the most important ports of the Mexican Pacific between Puerto Madero and 
San Blas (Guerrero, 2010: paragraph 1).
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Central and South America to the United States. This is due to Tamaulipas’s long bor-
der with the U.S. and its extensive sea coast (see Figure 1); what is more, Tamaulipas 
has 17 international bridges to the U.S. between Nuevo Laredo and Matamoros on the 
Gulf Coast, more than any other Mexican state.
Violence in Tamaulipas has increased drastically in the past couple of years, par-
ticularly since January 25, 2010, with the definitive rupture between the main orga-
nized crime groups operating in the state: the Gulf Cartel and its former enforcers, the 
heavily-armed Zetas. In 2009, Mexico’s federal government reported 90 drug-related 
murders in Tamaulipas. That number jumped more than 10-fold in just one year to 
1 209 in 2010 (see Table 1). Spectacular, violent drug-related incidents in Tamaulipas 
such as gristly massacres and battles between government forces and drug gangs 
have become a staple in Mexican as well as international media. The year 2010, in 
particular, was scarred by a massive number of drug-related execution-style murders 
of gunmen, federal police, soldiers, civilians, and even high level political figures, such 
as gubernatorial candidate Rodolfo Torre-Cantú, considered a shoo-in the election, 
who was gunned down along with his bodyguards on a main road leading to the state 
capital Victoria’s airport. No one has been arrested for his murder.
A number of factors have contributed to the growing violence in northern Mex ico. 
These include the failure of the maquiladora industry to fulfill the promises of an ade-
 quate source of income for the local population and the corruption of local and state 
po lice forces and other institutions by powerful, wealthy drug cartels, as well as the dead-
ly splits between the main dtos operating in the area. But three key factors are driving 
the new wave of violence in Tamaulipas. These are 1) the para-militarization of the Zetas 
and the Gulf Cartel, the two main organized crime groups operating in the state; 2) the 
definitive rupture between these organizations; and, 3) endemic corruption in Mex-
 ico’s “new democratic” times since the long-time ruling Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (pri) lost its 71-year hold on the presidency in 2000. The new configuration of the 
Mexican political system as a result of the democratization process, combined with 
high levels of corruption and weak local and federal political institutions, have had a 
major impact on the extreme levels of violence observed in this northern Mexican state.
the spectAcle of drug VIolence In mexIco’s drug-WAr tImes
The Media Spectacle, Drug Violence in Mexico, and the Spillover Effect
The subtle but profound ways in which the media influence and manipulate public 
opinion are well known (Parenti, 1982). In this regard, Leo R. Chavez (2001) suggests 
that media images not only reflect the national mood, but also play a powerful role 
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Figure 1
THE TEXAS-TAMAULIPAS BORDER
Source: Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts and Texas Department of Transportation, 2001.
in shaping national discourse. At the same time, media images influence the creation 
of social identities (Coutin and Chock, 1996) and public policy design, as well as 
social, economic, and political relations.
The present work utilizes the concept of “media spectacle” to explain the cur-
rent state of U.S.-Mexico border relations in the times of Mexico’s drug war. The basic 
notion of media spectacle is taken from Douglas Kellner’s work, and builds on French 
theorist Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle (1967). Kellner defines media spectacle 
as a series of “phenomena of media culture that embody contemporary society’s 
basic values, serve to initiate individuals into its way of life, and dramatize its con-
troversies and struggles, as well as its modes of conflict resolution” (2003a: 2).  Accor d-
ing to Kellner, “the mainstream corporate media today in the United States process 
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events, news, and information in the form of media spectacle,” that is, by “techno-
logically mediated events, in which media forms like broadcasting, print media, or 
the Internet process events in a spectacular form” (2008: 1).
Kellner recognizes that “the corporate media [in the U.S.] has been exploiting 
fear for decades in their excessive presentation of murder and violence and dramatization 
of a wide range of threats from foreign enemies and within everyday life” (2003b: 91). 
This tendency has intensified since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The per-
ception of the existence of a continuing terrorist threat after these events, and the 
incorporation of this idea into U.S. American public discourse –and as a staple for 
mass media, both as news and entertainment– have created a media spectacle and 
stirred up significant levels of fear among the U.S. population. 
Figure 1
THE TEXAS-TAMAULIPAS BORDER
(continuation)
Source: Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts and Texas Department of Transportation, 2001.
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Nowadays, in the United States, the idea of a terrorist strike from the south has 
combined with the unprecedented levels of drug violence in Mexico and the percep-
tion that this violence could soon spill across the U.S.-Mexico border. This mix has 
become what Kellner (2008) conceives as a media spectacle. And this media specta-
cle is fed by exaggerated –and frequently inaccurate– statements about the situation 
in Mexico. In this context, the phrases utilized by some journalists, politicians, and 
analysts, and presented by U.S. mass media cause fear among the population; and some 
of the relevant concerns are sometimes unfounded.
A good example is this recent statement made by George W. Grayson, a profes-
sor of government at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia: 
“The Zetas are trying to recruit [migrants] to become part of the Zetas organization 
and if they resist or if they look cross-eyed on the Zetas’ commander, they are likely 
to wind up in a grave” (Brownsville Herald, 2011: paragraph 18). Grayson’s assertion 
is exaggerated and inaccurate. He suggests, without providing enough evidence or 
background information, that migrants are being kidnapped throughout the country. 
To say that the kidnappings and mass assassination of migrants are being perpetrated 
only by the Zetas is an oversimplification of the problem; other groups are also in-
volved, and control different areas of the country. Moreover, the claim that this phe-
nomenon is occurring nationwide is misguided.
The problem is indeed serious, but more information needs to be provided to 
make an accurate assessment of the situation. When talking about the Zetas, we need 
more analysis and fewer exaggerated assertions that quickly become part of the me-
dia spectacle. It does not seem useful, for example, to refer to the Zetas as Grayson 
does, that is, as a “bloodthirsty sadistic organization” that serves the “lowest rungs 
of hell” (Brownsville Herald, 2011: paragraph 19). Instead, we would need to further 
explain the Zetas’ practices, motivations, and origins, as well as their impact on the 
current situation of extreme drug violence in Mexico.
The problem of drug violence and insecurity in Mexico has reached alarming levels; 
however, the Mexican government’s strategy to fight this does not seem to be working. 
That Mexico is becoming a “failed state,” or that certain states –such as Ta maulipas– are 
“falling into anarchy” is a common theme reiterated in respectable periodicals. According 
to Nicholas Casey and José de Córdoba of the Wall Street Journal, for example, “Some parts 
of Mexico are caught in the grip of violence so profound that government seems al-
most beside the point” (2010: paragraph 6). This is particularly true in the northern cit-
ies of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua; Torreón, Coahuila; Ciudad Mier and San Fernando, 
Tamaulipas; and even Monterrey, the capital city of the rich state of Nuevo León.
The case of Tamaulipas, and especially of its border region with Texas, is em-
blematic. The assassination of 72 migrants in the municipality of San Fernando in 
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August 2010 and the discovery of more than 200 bodies buried in the same area in 
April 2011 demonstrate, according to Melissa del Bosque of the Texas Observer, “how 
little control the federal government exerts over Tamaulipas.” According to Del Bos-
que, “The cartels have now moved beyond drug violence to murdering . . . civilians, 
and the government seems incapable of stopping it” (2011b: paragraph 11).
These unprecedented levels of violence in Mexico and the incapacity of Mexican 
authorities to control the situation notwithstanding, we are not so sure of the breadth 
and depth of the serious threats of violence that the United States claim, and the 
media and some politicians in this country have alleged. The argument here does 
not have to do with the consequences of this critical problem for Mexico. What mat-
ters in this case are the negative effects that the Mexican drug war and related violence 
could have on the United States. Recently, for example, two retired army generals, 
Barry R. McCaffrey and Robert H. Scales, produced a report titled “Texas Border 
Security: A Strategic Military Assessment,” which concluded that the Texas side of the 
border had become a “war zone” as a result of the drug problem in Mexico (2011).
So-called “spillover violence” is an important concern for U.S. citizens. But so 
far, it has been negligible, as the vast majority of drug-related violence has stayed on 
the Mexican side of the border. The best example of this is the contrast between 
Ciudad Juárez, Mexico’s most dangerous city, and its sister city just across the bor-
der, El Paso. There is indeed some evidence of drug-related shootings, kidnappings, 
and even assassinations in some U.S. cities and towns, especially in those located in 
the border area. But these events are quite infrequent, and their impact has been 
very limited. As of today, spillover violence is still hardly noticeable. In this regard, 
Professor Tony Payan, comments, “We have the occasional incident; it is a very tiny 
fraction compared to what is going on the other side of the border” (Ybarra, 2011: 
paragraph 23).
Nonetheless, U.S. Americans are still concerned about the phenomenon —one 
that barely exists. Concern about this almost non-existent situation is driven by the 
alarming and exaggerated statements made by some U.S. officials who present a 
spectacular view of how drug violence in Mexico is allegedly spiraling out of control 
and is an imminent threat to U.S. national security. Some top-level U.S. government 
officials like Under Secretary of the Army Joseph W. Westphal and Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton have suggested the presence of a “narco-insurgency” in Mexico. In 
September 2010, Clinton stated that the use of car bombs made Mexico’s drug violence 
seem like the violence suffered by Colombia 20 years ago. “Drug violence in Mexico 
bears the mark of an insurgency,” Clinton concluded (Stevenson, 2010: paragraph 1).
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publIc dIscourse on drug VIolence And nArco-terrorIsm
The risks of a narco-insurgency and drug violence creeping over the border from 
Mexico have led many influential officials and analysts in the U.S. to debate the need 
of further strengthening border security. Such a perceived necessity has been also 
linked to the idea of a plausible terrorist threat coming from the southern border. For 
instance, a top adviser to President Barack Obama alleged that “terrorists seeking to 
unleash havoc in the United States could use Texas’ porous border with Mexico to 
enter this country.” At the same time, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper 
argued that this possibility represents a “significant threat” to the U.S. (Aguilar, 
2011a: paragraphs 1-2).
U.S. politicians and media outlets have even been making comparisons be-
tween Mexican drug traffickers and the deadliest Middle Eastern and Jihadist terror-
ists. In the southern part of the Texas-Tamaulipas border region, for example, the 
recent assassinations, beheadings, and bombings carried out by dtos “are drawing 
comparisons to murders by Muslim extremists” (Aguilar, 2010: paragraph 1). This 
idea has become part of the media spectacle of drug violence in Mexico. Vincent 
Perez, a spokesman for U.S. Representative Silvestre Reyes (D-El Paso), a former 
Border Patrol sector chief and previous chairman of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, alleges that drug cartels “frequently engage in brutal 
acts of narco-terrorism to undermine democratic institutions and the rule of law, and 
to incite fear among the people and law enforcement” (Aguilar, 2010: paragraph 9). 
Therefore, according to Reyes, the United States should do what it has done essen-
tially in Pakistan, “and that is start taking out the heads of the cartels” (Del Bosque, 
2011a: paragraph 2).
The spectacular way that media, public figures, and politicians have presented 
the risks of escalating spillover violence, narco-insurgency, and even narco-terror-
ism, poses an inaccurate and unrealistic panorama of the situation in the two neigh-
boring nations.4 U.S. intelligence and security officials have even suggested plausible 
ties between the major drug cartels operating in Mexico (such as the Zetas) and Al 
Qaeda or Al Qaeda affiliates. For example, Department of Homeland Security Se c-
retary Janet Napolitano mentioned this possibility in testimony before a congression-
al committee in February 2011. In particular, she expressed Washington’s concern 
about an eventual alliance between Al Qaeda and the Zetas (Wilkinson, 2011).
4  For example, a recent Austin American-Statesman analysis shows that official statistics “don’t back up 
claims of rampant drug cartel-related crime along [the U.S. side of the] border” (Schwartz and McDonald, 
2011).
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Many believe the possibility of such an alliance to be unrealistic, given the two 
organizations’ different aims. “The lines should not be blurred to link the cartels with 
terrorist activities,” said Carlos Pascual, former U.S. ambassador to Mexico (Aguilar, 
2010: paragraph 8). Unlike Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups, Mexican 
dtos do not espouse a political or religious ideology. Similarly, Eric Olson, a senior 
associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, points out that dtos are “not ideologically motivated” and therefore one 
needs to make a distinction between them and terrorist organizations (Aguilar, 
2011b: paragraph 11).
Nevertheless, the idea that Mexican dtos could form a profitable partnership 
with terrorists has been incorporated into a spectacle created by some interest groups 
or political actors in the United States to further their political and economic agen-
das. For example, U.S. Representative Michael McCaul (R-Austin), a former chief 
of counter terrorism and national security at the U.S. Attorney’s Office, is “seeking 
to designate seven of the top Mexican cartels as ‘foreign terrorist organizations,’ a 
move he says would give law enforcement in the U.S. enhanced tools to combat the 
cartels” (Aguilar, 2011b: paragraph 1). In particular, he targets La Familia Michoacana, 
the cartel of Los Arellano Felix, the Zetas, the Beltran-Leyva cartel, as well as the Gulf, 
Juárez, and Sinaloa cartels.
McCaul says these organizations fit exactly the definition under the federal law 
on terrorism, since their purpose is “to intimidate a civilian population or a govern-
ment by assassination or kidnappings.” And adding to the spectacle of Mexico’s 
drug violence, McCaul contends, “I am concerned that Mexico is losing this war against 
the drug cartels and so are we” (Aguilar, 2011b: paragraph 5). U.S. Congressman 
Silvestre Reyes agrees with McCaul, claiming that designating dtos as terrorist orga-
nizations will “provide additional tools to help combat drug cartels and the threat 
they pose to the security of the United States, Mexico, and Central and South Amer-
ica” (Aguilar, 2011b: paragraph 9).
These types of statements have become common coin in the public discourse 
and are widely disseminated through the mass media. These claims by U.S. politi-
cians and other political-economic actors are often made in order to manipulate the 
public perception of reality, justify specific policies, and achieve certain political and 
material goals. The spectacle of Mexico’s drug violence has already had a concrete 
impact on U.S. public policy, particularly in the areas of immigration and national 
security. As Schwartz and McDonald point out, “Assessments of border security 
drive funding decisions involving hundreds of millions of dollars —ranging from 
sending National Guard troops to the Rio Grande and funding equipment and over-
time for local enforcement agencies to building a [US]$2.6 billion border fence” 
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(2011: paragraph 14). At the same time, such policies have had a significant impact 
on border economics, Mexico’s border security policies, and economic development 
policies on both sides of the border.
the spectAcle of drug VIolence, 
u.s. ImmIgrAtIon polIcy, And border securIty
The Media Spectacle of Illegal Immigration and U.S. Immigration Policy
Immigration policy reform is one of the most controversial issues in the United 
States, home to approximately 11.2 million undocumented immigrants (Passel and 
Cohn, 2011), most of whom are Mexican.5 Most analysts agree the U.S.’s dysfunc-
tional immigration policies need deep structural reform. But this appears unattain-
able for the near future, given U.S. electoral politics, the country’s economic straits, 
and the unprecedented drug violence in Mexico, particularly in its northern border 
states. Indeed, all attempts to reform the U.S. immigration system in the last few 
years have failed, while new and controversial legislation that “criminalizes” un-
documented immigrants has been passed in a number of states, including Arizona, 
Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.
In the meantime, the U.S. has implemented measures designed to curb illegal 
migration across the Mexican border. Among the most recent U.S. immigration pol-
icy initiatives is the construction of a wall along the border and the creation of a new 
guest worker program (Kretsedemas, 2008).6 U.S. authorities have increased the 
number of Border Patrol agents and the funding for better surveillance technology 
(Nevins, 2002). As a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, controls on 
immigration have tightened even more with the goal of protecting U.S. national se-
curity (Sheikh, 2008; Welch and Schuster, 2008). The exponential escalation of drug 
violence in the Mexican border states has reinforced this perspective, helping to im-
pose higher barriers to immigration from the south and to scuttle the passage of a 
comprehensive immigration reform act.
5  According to Pew Hispanic Center estimates based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau, as of 2011, some 
6.1 million unauthorized Mexican immigrants were living in the U.S. (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2012).
6  Recent pieces of immigration-related legislation impose harsher penalties for immigrants in general. The 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, for example, restricted access to 
public assistance programs for noncitizen legal immigrants, and set a lifetime limit on public assistance for 
all residents (National Research Council, 1998). Consider also the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penal-
ty Act (aedpa) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (iirira) of 1996 that signi-
ficantly increased the categories of criminal activity for which immigrants, both legal and illegal, can be 
deported and detained (see Correa-Cabrera and Rojas-Arenaza, 2010).
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The perception of an economic, security, and even cultural threat to the U.S. from 
Mexican immigration has increased in the last 20 years. Threat perception is central 
to the formation of negative opinions about immigrants, and public opinion about 
immigration in the United States has become increasingly negative. In fact, “research 
supports the contention that attitudes toward immigrants are hardening in the 
United States as the native population perceive threats to personal security and cul-
tural identity” (Larsen, et al., 2009: 127).7 Fear of job loss to immigrants and increased 
demand on social services for undocumented immigrants –from health care to educa-
tion– as well as concerns about illegal drug trafficking seem to be behind the increas-
ingly negative anti-immigration attitudes in the United States (Andreas, 2000).
The release of inaccurate immigration statistics that depict net losses for U.S. 
society derived from undocumented immigration and the attention given them by 
the media have been at the center of many recent immigration policy debates in the 
United States. Anti-immigrant groups, with access to the mass media, have used 
these statistics to promote the idea that undocumented workers hurt the U.S. econ-
omy, increase crime rates, and take away the jobs of U.S. citizens (Correa-Cabrera 
and Rojas-Arenaza, 2010).
Media images not only reflect the national mood but also play a powerful role in 
shaping national discourse. In the recent years, the media have exercised significant 
influence over the public’s increasing fear of undocumented immigration. The media 
appear to have created a spectacle of illegal immigration and U.S. immigration policy 
(Chavez, 2001, 2007, 2008). Leo Chavez (2007) views the Minuteman Project’s border 
monitoring, for example, as a practice that combines both spectacle and surveillance. 
According to him, the Minuteman Project used surveillance to produce a spectacle on 
the Arizona-Mexico border. Finding undocumented border crossers became, for 
Chavez, part of the “show,” and what he describes as a “media circus.”
Most recently, illegal Mexican immigration has been associated with drug vio-
lence and even with Islamic terrorism. A careful analysis shows that these associa-
tions are wrong.  Undocumented immigration, drug trafficking, and Middle Eastern 
terrorism are three separate and generally unrelated phenomena. Nevertheless, they 
have often been lumped together by the media as one intertwined problem. This 
perception has had a destructive impact on recent U.S. policies designed to regulate 
undocumented immigration and has prevented progress on immigration reform (Correa-
Cabrera and Rojas-Arenaza, 2010).
7  At the same time, public discourse has produced and sustained negative public perceptions of the Latino 
community and its place in U.S. society (Santa Ana, 2002).
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U.S. immigration policy today has not been effective even though illegal immi-
gration to the United States from Mexico and Central America has diminished.8 
According to some, the increasing amounts of resources spent on border surveillance 
do not seem to have been cost-effective in terms of the number of apprehended border 
crossers per dollar spent (Massey, Durand, and Malone, 2002). Also, as Joseph Nevins 
comments, the recent strategies of deterring illegal immigration may raise the “costs 
and risks of reentering the United States,” thus encouraging illegal immigrants al-
ready in the United States to remain (2002: 128). According to Nevins, the new immigra-
tion legislation “has also encouraged, ironically, increased criminal activity in the form 
of migrant smuggling enterprises that now occur all along the border” (142).
What is more, new waves of immigrants experience further dilemmas related to 
drug trafficking, gang violence, and human rights abuses. This situation is evident in 
the Texas-Tamaulipas border region, where flows of illegal immigration to the U.S. 
are particularly significant. The new dilemmas of Mexico-U.S. migration in violent 
times in this area can be illustrated by two major cases: 1) the massacre of 72 migrants 
on August 25, 2010, in San Fernando, Tamaulipas; and 2) the discovery of dozens of 
stash houses in cities all along the Tamaulipas border in the past couple of years. In 
times of extreme drug violence in Mexico, illegal immigration has become a human 
problem of considerable dimensions. The media spectacle of violence and illegal im-
migration has contributed to this situation.
Border Enforcement and the Spectacle of Violence
Over the past 20 years, law enforcement has visibly intensified along the border be-
tween the United States and Mexico. Examples of related legislation include Cali f-
ornia Proposition 187,9 Operation Blockade,10 and Operation Gatekeeper. Greater 
attention has been paid to this issue because of changes in economic and social forc-
es in the United States (Andreas, 2000). U.S. public discourse and the media specta-
cle of drug violence in Mexico have had a significant impact on the issue as well. The 
   8  According to a recent Pew Hispanic Center report, “The net migration flow from Mexico to the United 
States has stopped and may have reversed” (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2012).
   9  California Proposition 187 was a 1994 ballot initiative to establish a state-run citizenship screening system 
and deny education, health, and social services to undocumented immigrants. California voters passed 
the proposed law as a referendum in November 1994, but it was challenged in a legal suit and found un-
constitutional by a federal court.
10  This strategy was designed and implemented by the El Paso Border Patrol and consisted of posting 400 
agents directly on the banks of the Rio Grande in highly visible positions to deter unauthorized border 
crossings into the urban areas of El Paso from neighboring Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua.
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“perceived” risks of spillover violence, and now of narco-terrorism, have led to 
the further strengthening of U.S. border enforcement with such measures as the 
construction of a border fence.
But for some U.S politicians, such measures are not nearly enough, given the 
surge of drug-related violence in Mexico. Border enforcement has apparently become 
a “political necessity” (Andreas, 2000). Consider, for example, the following state-
ment by Texas Representative Michael McCaul: “Before we start talking about re-
forming our immigration policy we need to prioritize our national security and gain 
operational control of the border. . . .  Despite the president’s rhetoric that he has gone 
‘above and beyond’ to secure the border, this mission is not accomplished” (Fox 
News, 2011: paragraph 8).
One of the actions suggested to keep the Mexican mayhem from spilling over 
into the U.S. is to send troops to the border. Some politicians have even advocated 
sending troops into Mexico itself to fight against the alleged narco-insurgency and 
to protect the U.S. against narco-terrorism. In this context, a number of state govern-
ments in the United States are “taking it upon themselves to pass draconian immigra-
tion laws and deploy troops to the border, reacting to a perceived federal failure to 
act” (Aguilar, 2010: paragraph 12).
For example, in 2010, Texas Governor Rick Perry asked the federal government 
for “3 000 extra border patrol officers, 1 000 National Guard troops and aerial drones 
. . . to counter escalating border violence in Texas” (Aaronson, 2011: paragraph 11). 
Similarly, on April 26, 2011, the Texas State Senate passed a non-binding resolution 
that asks the Obama administration for more financial support in securing its border 
with Mexico. In particular, it asks for extra funds for Texas to enforce existing im-
migration laws. “The inability of Washington to develop some form of comprehen-
sive immigration reform that might address [the] border security problem puts an 
unfair and unreasonable burden on the entire state,” the resolution said (Aaronson, 
2011: paragraph 4).
concludIng remArks
Drastic measures have been taken both at the state and federal levels in the United 
States to strengthen border enforcement as a response to the unprecedented levels of 
drug violence in Mexico. The extreme responses to this phenomenon seem to have 
been influenced by a spectacle advanced by U.S. politicians and other political-eco-
nomic actors with particular agendas and economic interests. Are these responses 
effective? Are they beneficial for the U.S. American population in general? How are 
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they affecting U.S.-Mexico relations? It is not clear that recent U.S. border security 
measures have been effective in solving the problems that led to their creation. It is 
not clear, in particular, that such measures have solved the problem of illegal immi-
gration. It is not clear whether the United States needs to implement these policies, or 
if a spectacle of drug violence has been utilized only to advance particular interests or 
political agendas.
Evidence shows that the extremely high costs of the most recent border security 
measures, including the construction of a fence along the U.S.-Mexico border, have 
far exceeded their social and economic benefits. One could argue that the consider-
able amount of resources allocated for border protection could have been used more 
effectively to solve problems in other areas, such as unemployment, education, so-
cial development, and the creation of infrastructure for economic development. 
Assessing the effects of these policies is still premature, but as of today, they do not 
seem to have had a net positive impact on the U.S. economy and society. However, 
they have apparently served to advance particular interests and electoral/political 
agendas. The benefits of tighter border enforcement in the United States have been 
mainly political and selective.
Some of these recent border security measures have led to a sharp rise in the 
number of deaths of unauthorized border crossers. Human rights abuses and en-
forcement excesses inflicted on local Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants 
have increased as a result of this new approach to border security and undocument-
ed immigration (Dunn, 2009). At the same time, these measures have had a negative 
impact on Mexico’s border economies, and thus on Mexico’s economic development 
in general (Correa-Cabrera, 2011). The negative effects of violence and U.S. border 
security policies on Mexico’s economic progress and political stability would also 
eventually affect the United States, as well as the relations between the two nations.
In other words, the current situation on the Mexican side of the border and the 
U.S. border policy framework might have negatively affected both countries. U.S. 
border policing and immigration policies, in particular, have helped “to produce 
social boundaries between “Americans” and “Mexicans,” “citizens” and “aliens” 
(Nevins, 2002: 59). In fact, as Mexican Professor John M. Ackerman recognizes, 
Mexico’s drug war strategy and the U.S. increase of border security are “short sight-
ed and damaging to both countries. . . . Instead of militarization, the United States 
should be working with Mexico on creative ways to bring about the social and eco-
nomic development it needs” (Del Bosque, 2011c: paragraph 15). Indeed, the spec-
tacle of border violence in the context of assessing effective policy measures plays a 
greater role in determining the gains and losses on both sides of the border.
215
The SpecTacle of Drug Violence
conTemporary iSSueS
bIblIogrAphy
aaronson, beCCa
2011 “Texas Senate to the Feds: Pay for Border Security,” Texas Tribune, April 26, 
http://www.texastribune.org/texas-legislature/82nd-legislative-session/
texas-senate-to-the-feds-pay-for-border-security/, accessed May 17, 2011.
aGuilar, Julián
2011a “Is the Border Vulnerable to Terrorists?,” Texas Tribune, March 17, http://
www.texastribune.org/texas-mexico-border-news/texas-mexico-border/is 
-the-border-vulnerable-to-terrorists/, accessed May 15, 2011.
2011b “Lawmaker Seeks to Label Cartels ‘Terrorists,’” Texas Tribune, April 22, 
http://www.texastribune.org/texas-mexico-border-news/texas-mexico 
-border/lawmaker-seeks-to-label-cartels-terrorists/, accessed May 15, 2011.
2010 “Ambassadors Say Mexico Is Not a Failed State,” Texas Tribune, August 17, 
http://www.texastribune.org/texas-mexico-border-news/texas-mexico 
-border/ambassadors-say-mexico-is-not-a-failed-state/, accessed May 15, 2011.
andreas, peter
2000 Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide, Ithaca, New York, Cornell Uni-
versity Press.
Brownsville Herald
2011 “Authorities Investigate Massacre in Mexico,” March 11, http://www 
.brownsvilleherald.com/articles/massacre-124961-mexico-authorities.html, 
accessed May 15, 2011.
Casey, niCholas, and José de Córdoba
2010 “Northern Mexico’s State of Anarchy. Residents Abandon a Border Town as 
Vicious Drug Cartels Go to War,” Wall Street Journal, November 20, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704104104575622840256881122 
.html, accessed March 4, 2011.
Chavez, leo r.
2008 The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens and the Nation, Stanford, 
California, Stanford University Press.
2007 “The Spectacle in the Desert: The Minuteman Project on the U.S.-Mexico 
Border,” in David Pratten and Atreyee Sen, eds., Global Vigilantes: Anthro pological 
216
Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera
norteamériCa
Pers pectives on Justice and Violence, London, C. Hurst & Company Publishers, 
pp. 25-46.
2001 Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation, Berkeley, 
California, University of California Press.
Correa-Cabrera, Guadalupe
2011 “The Current Dilemmas of Mexico-U.S. Border Economics: Media Spectacles, 
Drug Violence, and U.S. Immigration Policy,” paper presented at the 2011 
American Society for Public Administration (aspa) Conference, Baltimore, 
Maryland, March 11-15.
Correa-Cabrera, Guadalupe, and MiriaM roJas-arenaza
2010 “The Mathematics of Mexico-U.S. Migration and U.S. Immigration Policy,” 
paper presented at the 23rd Annual Meeting of the Public Administration 
Theory Network (PAT-Net), Omaha, Nebraska, May 20-23.
Coutin, susan bibler, and phyllis pease ChoCk
1996 “Your Friend, the Illegal: Definition and Paradox in Newspaper Accounts of 
U.S. Immigration Reform,” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, vol. 2, 
nos. 1-2, pp. 123-148.
debord, Guy
1967 The Society of the Spectacle, New York, Zone Books.
del bosque, Melissa
2011a “Congressman Won’t Rule Out Drone Strikes in Mexico,” Texas Observer, 
April 4, http://www.texasobserver.org/lalinea/congressman-suggests-drone 
-strikes-in-mexico, accessed May 15, 2011.
2011b “Los Zetas’ Brutal Business Model,” Texas Observer, May 3, http://www.texas 
o bserver.org/lalinea/los-zetas-brutal-business-model, accessed May 15, 2011.
2011c “Mexicans Thinking Egyptian,” Texas Observer, May 8, http://www.texas 
o bserver.org/lalinea/mexicans-thinking-egyptian, accessed May 15, 2011.
dunn, tiMothy J.
2009 Blockading the Border and Human Rights: The El Paso Operation that Remade 
Immigration Enforcement, Austin, University of Texas Press.
217
The SpecTacle of Drug Violence
conTemporary iSSueS
Fox news
2011 “GOP Disputes Obama’s Claim that Border Security Has Improved,” 
foxnews.com, May 10, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/05/10/obama 
-urges-congress-pass-immigration-reform/, accessed May 17, 2011.
Guerrero, eduardo
2010 “La guerra por Tamaulipas,” Nexos en línea, August 1, http://www.nexos 
.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=248541, accessed September 12, 2012.
herrera, rolando
2012 “Reportan 47,515 narcoejecuciones,” Reforma, January 12, http://reforma 
.vlex.com.mx/vid/reportan-narcoejecuciones-344529378, accessed February 
12, 2012.
kellner, douGlas
2008 “Media Spectacle and the 2008 Presidential Election: Some Pre-election 
Reflections,” ucla’s Journal of Cinema and Media Studies, Fall, pp. 1-19.
2003a Media Spectacle, New York, Routledge.
2003b “September 11. Spectacles of Terror, and Media Manipulation: A Critique of 
Jihadist and Bush Media Politics,” Logos, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 86-102.
kretsedeMas, philip
2008 “Immigration Enforcement and the Complication of National Sovereignty: 
Understanding Local Enforcement as an Exercise in Neoliberal Governance,” 
American Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 553-573.
larsen, knud s., kruM kruMov, hao van le, reidar oMMundsen, 
and kees van der veer
2009 “Threat Perception and Attitudes toward Documented and Undocumented 
Immigrants in the United States: Framing the Debate and Conflict Reso lution,” 
European Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 115-134.
Massey, douGlas s., JorGe durand, and nolan J. Malone
2002 Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integra-
tion, New York, Russell Sage Foundation.
MCCaffrey, barry r., and robert h. sCales
2011 “Texas Border Security: A Strategic Military Assessment,” Colgen, September 26, 
218
Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera
norteamériCa
http://www.mccaffreyassociates.com/pages/documents/Final_Report 
-Texas_Border_Security.pdf, accessed September 29, 2011.
Mendoza, enrique
2011 “Quinto año de gobierno: 60 mil 420 ejecuciones,” Semanario Zeta 1967, De -
cember 12, http://www.zetatijuana.com/2011/12/12/quinto-ano-de-gobier no-
60-mil-420-ejecuciones/, accessed December 22, 2011.
nrC (national researCh CounCil)
1998 The Immigration Debate: Studies on the Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects 
of Immigration, Washington, D.C., National Academy Press.
nava, José
2011 “Gagging the Media: The Paramilitarization of Drug Trafficking Organi-
zations and Its Consequences on the Freedom of Press in the Texas-Tamau-
lipas Border Region,” unpublished master’s thesis, Brownsville, Texas, The 
University of Texas at Brownsville.
nevins, Joseph
2001 Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the “Illegal Alien” and the Remaking of the U.S.-
Mexico Boundary, New York, Routledge.
ofiCina de la presidenCia, Gobierno federal
2010 “Base de Datos de Fallecimientos Ocurridos por Presunta Rivalidad Delin-
cuencial,” Presidencia de la República, December 31, http://www.presi den cia 
.gob.mx/base-de-datos-de-fallecimientos/, accessed October 18, 2012.
parenti, MiChael
1982 Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media, New York, St. Martin’s Press.
passel, Jeffrey s., and d’vera Cohn
2011 Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010, Washington, 
D.C., Pew Hispanic Center.
passel, Jeffrey s.,  d’vera Cohn, and ana González-barrera
2012 Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero –and Perhaps Less, Washington, D.C., Pew 
Hispanic Center.
219
The SpecTacle of Drug Violence
conTemporary iSSueS
santa ana, otto
2002 Brown Tide Rising: Metaphors of Latinos in Contemporary American Public Dis-
course, Austin, Texas, University of Texas Press.
sChwartz, JereMy, and Christian MCdonald
2011 “Statesman Analysis Shows that Statistics Don’t Back Up Claims of Rampant 
Drug Cartel-Related Crime along Border,” Austin American-Statesman, 
Octo ber 29, http://www.statesman.com/news/texas/statesman-analysis 
-shows-that-sta tis tics-dont-back-up-1940906.html?printArticle=y, accessed Nov-
ember 13, 2011.
sheikh, iruM
2008 “Racializing, Criminalizing, and Silencing 9/11 Deportees,” in David C. 
Brotherton and Philip Kretsedemas, eds., Keeping Out the Other: A Critical 
Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today, New York, Columbia University 
Press, pp. 81-107.
stevenson, Mark
2010 “Clinton: Mexican Drug Cartels like Insurgency,” fox news.com, September 9, 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/09/08/mexican-mayor-killed 
-marines-arrest-suspects-massacre-migrants/, accessed March 4, 2011.
texas CoMptroller of publiC aCCounts and texas departMent of transportation 
2001 “State Functions at the Texas-Mexico Border and Cross-Border Transpor tation” 
report.
welCh, MiChael, and liza sChuster
2008 “American and British Constructions of Asylum Seekers: Moral Panic, De-
tention, and Human Rights,” in David C. Brotherton and Philip Kretse de mas, 
eds., Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement 
Today, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 138-160.
wilkinson, traCy
2011 “Single Day’s Death Toll in Ciudad Juarez is 18,” Los Angeles Times, February 
12, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/12/world/la-fg-mexico-juarez 
-20110212, accessed March 4, 2011.
220
Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera
norteamériCa
ybarra, MaGGie
2011 “Officials Debate Parameters of Spillover Violence,” El Paso Times, January 
22, http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_17163520, accessed March 4, 2011.
